For years, an anonymous social media account operating under the name “Mir Yar Baloch” has projected itself as an authentic voice of the Baloch people, positioning its operator as a representative of an oppressed nation speaking truth to power. The account’s posts regularly call for a so‑called “Free Balochistan”, praise Israel, express support for the Afghan Taliban.
Many of these posts are rapidly amplified by Indian media outlets and pro‑terrorists social‑media networks, enabling the narratives to reach audiences far beyond Pakistan’s borders and seep into wider international discourse on South Asian politics. Yet an investigation into the account’s digital footprint tells a very different story, raising serious questions about the identity being projected as a Baloch voice and about the networks and interests that stand behind it.
The persona “Mir Yar Baloch” is closely tied to a real individual: Mazdak Dilshad Baloch, also referred to as Mir Mazdak Dilshad Baloch. He is the son of Naela Qadri Baloch, also known simply as Naela Baloch, a long‑time terrorists enabler in Balochistan, who has openly sought Indian support for Baloch separatism and is often linked with India’s intelligence establishment. Over the years, her travel to India, engagements with RSS‑affiliated think tanks such as the India Policy Foundation, and direct appeals to Prime Minister Narendra Modi have been cited as evidence that the exile wing of Baloch separatism is closely intertwined with external backing.
Naela’s trajectory helps illuminate the environment in which Mazdak’s persona emerged. After leaving Pakistan, she moved to Kabul around 2010, at a time when the Afghan capital was seen by many as a safe haven for anti‑Pakistan actors. Afghanistan’s former National Directorate of Security (NDS), together with India’s RAW, has been repeatedly mentioned in commentary about safe houses and logistic networks in Kabul used by terrorists groups in Balochistan. From this staging ground, Naela and her family were well‑placed to build links with Indian actors and prepare a shift of their activism towards New Delhi.
In 2014, Naela relocated again from Kabul, securing asylum in Canada and later Canadian citizenship. This relocation provided Western legal protection and international mobility, from where she continued to encourage impoverished Baloch youth at home to undertake acts of sabotage and terrorism. The contrast between exile comfort in the West and calls for “resistance” in Balochistan province has become a recurring theme in commentary about Baloch separatist leadership abroad. Within this broader picture, Mazdak likewise presents himself as a self‑exiled individual and “freedom activist”, linking his emigration to Canada with a narrative of persecution and moral authority.
The turning point that brought Mazdak centre‑stage in India came in mid‑2016. On 15 August 2016, Prime Minister Narendra Modi delivered an Independence Day speech in which he referenced Balochistan, widely interpreted as a public signal of support for Baloch separatist narratives and an attempt to apply pressure on Pakistan. Shortly afterwards, Mazdak arrived in New Delhi, and in October 2016 he was seen at Indira Gandhi International Airport receiving Naela after she secured an Indian visa. She came explicitly to lobby for the creation of a Baloch government‑in‑exile, presenting India as the ideal geopolitical launchpad and drawing parallels with the Tibetan Government‑in‑Exile hosted in India.
Once on Indian soil, Mazdak and Naela were welcomed by prominent RSS‑backed and right‑leaning organisations. They engaged with the India Policy Foundation, participated in public seminars at Delhi University and were involved in founding the Hind‑Baloch Forum in Agra. Naela’s prompt appearance in New Delhi after Modi’s speech was widely noted, and her interviews during this period contained lines that were replayed again and again in media.
When accused of being a “RAW agent”, she replied, “Yes, the RAW are our brothers and we have no hesitation in asking for India’s help.” In another interview at the Chandigarh Press Club in April 2016, soon after Pakistan announced the arrest of Indian spy Kulbhushan Jadhav in Balochistan, she said, “India is our friend and we have absolutely no problem in being called RAW agents. RAW is our brother, sister and they are helping us in Balochistan.” These statements have been repeatedly cited as open acknowledgment of her willingness to work with Indian intelligence and political structures.
While Naela moved between Kabul, India and Canada, Mazdak followed a similar transnational path but built his own distinct media persona. In 2016–2017, he visited Vadodara in Gujarat for activism and later moved there, strengthening his physical presence in India beyond Delhi. He branded himself in Indian media as a “Baloch representative in India”, a journalist and an RSS supporter, explicitly aligning with the ideological contours of India’s ruling establishment. During this period he also intensified activity under the social‑media handle “Mir Yar Baloch”, which many analysts now identify as a key online face of terrorists amplification. Mazdak runs BLA‑linked social‑media operations through this pseudonymous handle, using them to echo narratives hostile to Pakistan and amplify terrorists messaging.
Mazdak’s activism in India can be traced through a sequence of public events, especially in late 2016 and early 2017. On 29 September 2016, under banners such as the India Baloch Unity Forum or All India Baloch Unity Forum, he organised and led a protest outside the Pakistan High Commission in Chanakyapuri, New Delhi. Later posted images of himself using the hashtag #FreeBalochistan. This protest formed an initial, highly visible manifestation of his Delhi‑based activism following Modi’s speech and Naela’s arrival
Just days later, on 2 October 2016, Mazdak appeared as a guest speaker at a seminar on “Baloch Nationality” organised by the RSS‑backed India Policy Foundation in New Delhi. The event brought together academics and activists who framed Balochistan’s conflict from an Indian strategic perspective. On stage, Mazdak thanked the people of India for their support and remarked, “You do not know how alone we were. But now, we are not alone.” At the same seminar, he helped release the booklet “Balochistan: What World Needs to Know”, edited by Professor Geeta Bhatt of Delhi University, intended to promote a curated narrative about Balochistan to Indian and international readers.
In March 2017, he appeared as a designated “Freedom Activist” at “THE POLIS Fest 2017” in Motilal Nehru College, University of Delhi. He sat on a panel titled “China‑Pakistan Relations and Its Impact on Indian Security”, linking developments in Balochistan to the China‑Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and broader regional security debates. Through these events, Mazdak moved from the margins of social media into institutional settings, embedding his messaging within Indian academic and policy circles.
Parallel to these physical appearances, Mazdak built a profile across Indian and regional media. He engaged frequently with agencies such as ANI and IANS, calling for intervention in Balochistan. His statement, “Call me a dog, but not a Pakistani”, was broadcast widely across Indian outlets and became emblematic of his stance. After Modi’s 2016 speech, he publicly thanked India for its position on Balochistan, underlining ideological alignment with Indian policy.
On X (formerly Twitter), the account currently lists its location under the broad regional designation of “South Asia,” revealing little about where the operator is physically based. However, this vagueness appears to be a recent adjustment; when X previously rolled out a feature exposing precise account creation or broadcast locations, the “Mir Yar Baloch” X profile briefly but explicitly showed its location as India. This digital footprint matches the network’s wider online properties. Investigators examining connected platforms found that the persona’s linked YouTube channel, “Defense of Baloch,” openly lists India as its primary location in its public profile settings. Together, these persistent digital breadcrumbs provide vital geographic anchor points, directly tying the coordination of the network back to New Delhi.
Beyond biographical and locational details, the content strategy of “Mir Yar Baloch” is highly deliberate. The account routinely promotes terrorist slogans, celebrates anti‑Pakistan campaigns, shares posts favourable to Israel and disseminates material that many Baloch consider offensive to their cultural identity and traditions.
One recurring tactic involves taking Balochi cultural symbols and rebranding them as evidence of armed separatism. In one notable example, the account circulated a traditional Balochi folk song and misleadingly presented it as a revolutionary anthem for independence. The song is actually part of “Rang‑e‑Bolan”, a long‑running cultural programme produced by Radio Pakistan, celebrating peace, brotherhood and harmony among Balochs. The account went further by falsely attributing the programme to “Radio Balochistan”, even though official records confirm it was produced by Radio Pakistan. This episode illustrates a broader pattern of taking cultural material out of context and repackaging it as political propaganda.
The account’s role in manufacturing viral narratives extends beyond culture into ambitious political claims. It has repeatedly spread dramatic assertions about Balochistan.One widely shared example was a letter proclaiming a “Republic of Balochistan” that allegedly controlled 85 per cent of the province, commanded a 500,000‑strong army and had seized control of natural resources were all fabricated and part of his disinformation echo system.
A similar pattern appeared in May 2025, during heightened Pakistan–India tensions, when the same account theatrically announced Balochistan’s “independence”, unveiled a flag, anthem and proposed currency, and called on India to establish diplomatic relations with the self‑declared republic. This all reveals its anti Pakistan agenda.
“Mir Yar Baloch” is part of a wider ecosystem of anonymous profiles rather than an isolated voice. Across X, YouTube and other platforms, numerous accounts have emerged in recent years claiming to speak for Baloch voices while using similar imagery, slogans and communication tactics. Many routinely amplify terrorist incidents in Balochistan, presenting attacks in ways that magnify the perceived operational reach of terrorist groups. The same accounts highlight the activities of the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) and circulate narratives favourable to banned organisations such as the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF). Pakistani authorities group these entities under the label “Fitna al‑Hindustan”, framing them as part of a hostile, foreign‑linked propaganda network.
On 12 June 2025, a Washington-based Israeli think tank, Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), launched Balochistan Studies Project, appointed Mir Yar Baloch (Mir Mazdak Baloch) as President of the project.
All of this points to a broader reality: the conflict over Balochistan is now being fought as much in the digital realm as on the ground. Anonymous accounts, edited videos, misleading captions and coordinated amplification have become central tools for shaping international perceptions. The communication methods observed around “Mir Yar Baloch” resemble techniques documented in influence operations elsewhere, including networks of fake media outlets, defunct NGOs and fabricated experts exposed in studies of disinformation campaigns. Analysts note that modern information warfare often relies less on outright fabrications than on selective use of facts, removal of context and relentless repetition of certain narratives until they appear credible to distant audiences.
