The assassination of Sessions Judge Abdul Hakeem Kakar in Mastung on 23 July 2026 was more than another terrorist attack in Balochistan. Coming just weeks after a landmark anti-terrorism verdict and followed within hours by an Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) claim of responsibility, the attack has brought attention to the growing BLA–ISKP convergence in Balochistan. Against the backdrop of escalating violence targeting judges, civilians and public infrastructure, the Mastung assassination has become a defining episode in understanding how the province’s terrorist threat is evolving and what it means for Pakistan’s counterterrorism response.
The judges were travelling from Quetta to the Sessions Court in Mastung to perform their official duties when heavily armed terrorists opened fire on their vehicle, according to official accounts.
The attack has been widely described as a direct assault on Pakistan’s judicial system and an attempt to intimidate judges involved in terrorism-related cases.
A Direct Attack on Pakistan’s Justice System
The targeted killing of Judge Abdul Hakeem Kakar represents more than an attack on an individual judicial officer. It strikes at the institutions responsible for enforcing the rule of law and prosecuting terrorism cases.
Many in Balochistan believe the assassination was intended to send a message to judges, prosecutors and courts handling terrorism trials, raising the cost of judicial accountability through violence and intimidation.
Attack Follows Conviction of BYC Leaders
The Mastung assassination came less than a month after the Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) Quetta sentenced Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) leaders Mahrang Baloch and Sibghatullah Shahji to life imprisonment under Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism Act.
The convictions related to the killing of Frontier Corps soldier Shabbir Ahmed during violent protests in Gwadar in July 2024.
Observers say the timing of the Mastung attack and the assassination was intended as retaliation against Pakistan’s anti-terrorism judicial process following the high-profile convictions.
BLA-BYC Nexus
The attack has once again brought attention to the relationship between the banned BLA and the Baloch Yakjehti Committee.
While the BLA carries out armed attacks, BYC provides political messaging and narratives that allegedly create ideological space benefiting proscribed terrorist organisations.
The assassination of a serving Sessions Judge immediately after the conviction of prominent BYC leaders has further provided credibility to this claim.
Following the convictions of BYC leaders, Amnesty International and several human rights organisations criticised Pakistan’s use of anti-terrorism legislation and called for the release of Mahrang Baloch.
But such criticism overlooks the country’s security environment and the persistent threat posed by terrorist organisations operating in Balochistan.
The assassination of judicial officers shortly after the convictions has reinforced government arguments regarding the need for enhanced security measures during terrorism trials.
Why Pakistan Uses Faceless Courts
The Mastung attack has renewed focus on Pakistan’s adoption of special security arrangements in terrorism cases, including:
- Protected or faceless court proceedings
- Witness protection mechanisms
- Enhanced judicial security
- Restricted movement protocols for judges handling terrorism cases
Such measures are necessary because judicial officers involved in terrorism prosecutions remain high-value targets for terrorist organisations.
The ISKP Claim: Coincidence or Strategic Messaging?
Perhaps the most intriguing development following the assassination was the speed with which ISKP claimed responsibility.
The claim was issued only hours after the attack, even as authorities identified the BLA behind the deadly attack.
One possibility is that ISKP was directly involved in the operation. Another is that the group sought to exploit a high-profile assassination for propaganda purposes. A third possibility is that assuming responsibility could divert attention from the actual perpetrators, complicate attribution and reduce immediate pressure on the group thayt has carried out the attack, the Banned BLA.
Growing Concerns About BLA–ISKP Convergence
Despite ideological differences, BLA and ISKP have essentially remained allies – both working in cahoots – to spread terrorism in Pakistan.
Both groups collaborate closely in planning and executing terrorist attacks within Pakistan. Their use of similar tactics including suicide bombings and high-profile media campaigns reveal a unified operational methodology.
ISKP had some presence in Mastung and ISKP could not have made any presence in Mastung without BLA’s alliance.
ISKP has no significant independent presence inside Pakistan; rather, it infiltrates Pakistani territory from Afghanistan and operates in nexus with BLA in Blochistan. This strategic infiltration relies on Afghan sanctuaries and Taliban protection to coordinate attacks inside Pakistan. The porous border allows smaller groups of ISKP and BLA to move freely, collaborate on operations, and intensify their impact.
The cooperation between ISKP and BLA inside Pakistan is thus entirely dependent on Afghan soil as their base of operations.
In recent years, both the BLA and ISKP have claimed or been linked to attacks against civilians, government institutions and security forces. Both have sought maximum media attention through high-profile operations designed to generate fear far beyond the immediate target.
Pakistani authorities have also pointed to the growing use of female suicide bombers, attacks on civilian infrastructure and coordinated propaganda campaigns as developments that warrant closer examination.
The assassination of Judge Abdul Hakeem Kakar did not occur in isolation.
It formed part of a broader pattern of escalating violence that has transformed Mastung into one of Balochistan’s most volatile districts.
Just one day before the assassination, terrorists intercepted a civilian passenger bus in Mastung. When the driver attempted to escape, gunmen opened indiscriminate fire, killing three passengers and injuring three others.
During the same period, the district witnessed an improvised explosive device (IED) attack targeting a military convoy, the destruction of a bridge in the Khad Kucha area and the arrest of two alleged BLA-affiliated female suicide bombers.
Viewed collectively rather than individually, these incidents suggest a sustained campaign designed to undermine governance, disrupt civilian life and challenge the state’s security presence.
Where earlier attacks often focused primarily on security personnel, recent incidents have increasingly targeted civilians, public infrastructure and judicial institutions.
The killing of passengers travelling on public transport, the destruction of bridges and the assassination of judges indicate an expansion in operational objectives beyond conventional insurgent tactics.
Such attacks affect not only the state’s security apparatus but also the broader functioning of society by disrupting transportation, economic activity and public confidence in government institutions.
Why Judicial Security Matters
The assassination also points to that why Pakistan needs the use of enhanced security measures during terrorism trials.
Protected proceedings, witness protection programmes, restricted judicial identities and specialised security arrangements have often been criticised by civil liberties advocates. But such safeguards become indispensable when judges, prosecutors and witnesses themselves become targets of assassination.
Continued attacks against judicial institutions and civilians could strengthen calls for additional action under the United Nations Security Council’s counterterrorism sanctions framework, including Resolution 1267 and related measures.
As Pakistan confronts an evolving terrorist threat, the events in Mastung underscore that protecting the judiciary is no longer solely a legal imperative—it has become a central pillar of the country’s national security strategy.
