India’s year at the helm of BRICS has ended with another joint declaration, another round of diplomatic promises and another set of commitments whose implementation remains uncertain.
Yet the more immediate problem for New Delhi is outside the BRICS summit altogether: despite its effort to remain acceptable to Washington, India now faces the prospect of tariffs of up to 100 per cent from the United States over its continued purchase of Russian oil.
That exposes the central weakness of India’s diplomatic balancing act.
But the fact that such a measure is now being seriously considered is significant.
The problem becomes clearer when India’s BRICS presidency is measured against outcomes rather than visibility.
The New Delhi summit produced a lengthy joint communiqué covering local-currency trade, financial cooperation and other areas of economic integration. But the fundamental disagreements inside BRICS remain. Reuters noted that China used the summit to advance proposals including a BRICS AI Open Source Zone and deeper economic integration, while India rejected China’s mBridge payment platform.
This is hardly the picture of a bloc moving decisively toward financial integration.
BRICS members continue to disagree over the extent and form of financial cooperation. Russia and China have pushed more strongly for alternatives to Western financial structures, while India has remained considerably more cautious.
India’s position within BRICS has always contained a contradiction.
New Delhi wants the grouping to become economically more important, but it does not want BRICS to evolve into a platform dominated by China or explicitly positioned against the United States.
That creates a structural dilemma.
China remains one of the principal drivers of deeper BRICS economic integration. Russia strongly supports reducing dependence on Western financial systems. India, however, has its own strategic rivalry with China and continues to place considerable value on its relationship with Washington.
The result is a BRICS that talks about deeper integration while its largest members remain divided over what that integration should actually mean.
The September summit demonstrated precisely this contradiction. China promoted deeper economic integration and new technology initiatives, while India remained cautious about mechanisms that could increase Beijing’s influence over the bloc’s financial architecture.
India continues to depend on Russian energy, while the United States remains one of India’s most important export markets. India’s merchandise exports to the United States reached $79.4 billion in 2024, making the US its largest single export destination.
The proposed 100 per cent tariff therefore carries considerable potential economic significance.
It could place pressure on precisely the sectors that depend heavily on access to the American market. Textiles, jewellery and other labour-intensive industries have substantial exposure to US demand, while steel and aluminium already face separate US tariff measures.
India’s own government has previously acknowledged the importance of the US market to its textile and apparel industry.
The current situation is particularly revealing because New Delhi has already spent considerable diplomatic effort improving trade relations with Washington.
Yet the Russian-oil issue remains capable of reopening the tariff question.
If India could not secure insulation from US pressure despite simultaneously cultivating Washington and maintaining its BRICS strategy, the limitations of that diplomatic approach become difficult to ignore.
The scale of India’s vulnerability is substantial.
An Indian parliamentary document identified $47.2 billion of India’s $86.4 billion in merchandise exports to the United States in 2024 as falling within categories subject to additional US tariff measures.
That distinction matters, but so does the broader exposure.
The United States is India’s largest export destination, while Russia is an important energy supplier. India therefore sits between two economic relationships that it cannot easily replace.
Russian oil helps India manage energy costs, but dependence on the US market gives Washington substantial economic leverage.
India cannot simply assume that purchasing cheaper Russian crude will remain insulated from the wider geopolitical consequences of its foreign-policy choices.
Just days before the BRICS summit, India’s Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal called for an accelerated India-Russia economic partnership and reiterated the goal of reaching $100 billion in bilateral trade by 2030.
That makes India’s predicament even more complicated.
The potential 100 per cent tariff should therefore not be viewed in isolation.
It is the latest manifestation of a broader problem: India’s diplomatic strategy has promised flexibility, but flexibility has not eliminated dependence.
India now has to manage the consequences.
The tariff threat has not yet become a 100 per cent duty, and the legislation remains subject to the US legislative process. But the threat itself demonstrates that Washington retains considerable leverage over New Delhi.
After a year in which New Delhi had the opportunity to demonstrate leadership through results, the bloc remains divided and many of its most ambitious economic proposals remain works in progress.
At the same time, India’s attempt to remain acceptable to Washington has not prevented the possibility of severe economic pressure over Russian oil.
The central question is therefore no longer whether India can balance Washington, Moscow and Beijing. It is whether that balancing strategy is actually delivering results.
So far, the record offers little evidence of a decisive breakthrough.
India got the BRICS chair. It still faces the tariff threat. And the gap between diplomatic declarations and concrete results is becoming increasingly difficult to conceal.
