Akhtar Mengal speaking at the Asma Jahangir Conference on Balochistan politics
Akhtar Mengal addresses the Asma Jahangir Conference amid debate over terrorism and governance in Balochistan.

Akhtar Mengal once again placed the blame for Balochistan’s crises squarely on the federal government and the military at the Asma Jahangir Conference. He spoke of repression, missing persons, and the absence of public representation, while openly acknowledging that support for the Balochistan Liberation Army exists within the province.

What his speech did not confront was the bloodstained reality of terrorism itself. Just weeks earlier, on 31 January, 36 civilians were killed in BLA attacks—ordinary people whose deaths rarely feature in political narratives. As Mengal’s accusations echoed through the conference hall, a harder question lingered outside it: after decades in power, why do Balochistan’s ruling elites speak only when power slips from their hands?

Akhtar Mengal’s Claims at the Asma Jahangir Conference

Akhtar Mengal accused the Pakistan military and the federal government of using brute force to deal with Balochistan’s problems. He alleged arrests, torture, enforced disappearances, and a system resembling military rule.

Such claims ignore the wider security environment of the province. Balochistan holds immense strategic importance for Pakistan due to Gwadar Port, its long and porous border with Afghanistan, and its exposure to militant groups and foreign interference.

The presence of the military in Balochistan has been essential in protecting the province from terrorism and external threats. This role has not been limited to forceful control but has focused on maintaining stability and safeguarding civilians who are the primary victims of militant violence.

What Mengal did not address is the role of Baloch political elites who have themselves ruled the province for decades. Figures such as Akhtar Mengal, Akbar Bugti, and Nawab Aslam Raisani have all served as chief ministers of Balochistan.

They were not sidelined leaders but central actors within the system. The failure to develop infrastructure, manage resources effectively, and improve governance during their time in power cannot be ignored. These shortcomings have played a major role in creating the grievances that Mengal now attributes solely to the military and the federal government.

It is also important to understand that the federal government cannot directly implement Public Sector Development Programme budgets in the province. These funds are executed through provincial governments and their departments. Responsibility for education, health, roads, water supply, and electricity lies primarily with the provincial leadership. Blaming Islamabad alone overlooks this constitutional and administrative reality.

Akhtar Mengal frequently accuses the state of exploiting Balochistan’s resources without providing opportunities for local people. This narrative conveniently avoids acknowledging the multiplier effect of development projects. Gwadar has generated employment and economic activity, Saindak has provided jobs and supported local trade, and Reko Diq has increasingly hired local workers.

The Reko Diq project employs more than 2,000 people, with around 87 percent belonging to Balochistan. The operating company has procured approximately 1.1 billion dollars’ worth of goods locally, strengthening transport, logistics, and regional markets. In addition, social sector investments such as the 100 million dollar Pak–China Friendship Hospital have contributed to healthcare access in the province.

Baloch Sardars, Power, and Unanswered Governance Failures

Mengal and other Baloch leaders have repeatedly been part of the national political system. They have held ministerial positions, served in parliament, and exercised significant influence.

Their failure to introduce meaningful reforms during their years in power must be questioned. The blame for Balochistan’s underdevelopment and instability cannot rest solely with the military or the federal government when provincial leadership had both authority and resources.

Akhtar Mengal’s February 2026 speech was largely a barrage of allegations aimed at federal institutions. What stood out was his silence on his own political failures and those of other Baloch sardars whose influence spans several decades.

This pattern of politics is not new. After 2018, and particularly in 2022, Akhtar Mengal played a key role in the political process that led to the removal of Imran Khan’s government. There was a clear expectation that this political bargain would result in his appointment as Chief Minister of Balochistan. When this ambition was not realized, Mengal began forcefully recalling Balochistan’s grievances, deprivation, and injustices.

The reality is that these sardars spent years within the corridors of power as chief ministers, members of the National Assembly, and senators. During this time, they failed to deliver tangible benefits for Baloch youth, ordinary citizens, or long-term provincial development.

Now, having lost power, they use issues such as missing persons, terrorism, and anti-state narratives as political shields, despite remaining silent on these matters when they themselves governed.

Public frustration has grown as people increasingly recognize that this political noise is driven less by public pain and more by the frustration of losing influence. Tensions escalated further when the current provincial government began scrutinizing illegal mining leases and land contracts.

During this review, dozens of illegal licenses were reportedly found in the names of Akhtar Mengal and his close relatives, which had generated profits for years. When these leases and contracts were cancelled, Mengal’s anger became visible, turning the dispute into a personal battle to protect vested interests.

When Akhtar Mengal was prevented from traveling to Dubai, he framed the decision as a personal humiliation rather than a state matter and further intensified his confrontational stance. Even during the recently failed terrorist operation referred to as “Herof-2,” Mengal’s political expectations were not met. Had the BLA succeeded, it could have destabilized the provincial government and provided the opposition with an opportunity to pursue politics of chaos.

There is also documented evidence, including video material, showing that Akhtar Mengal previously prayed for the success of BLA militants. Such a stance is deeply troubling, especially in light of the civilian deaths caused by terrorist attacks.

Even today, many believe that if Mengal were granted the chief ministership, he would suddenly declare that Balochistan’s problems had vanished and that prosperity had arrived. This contradiction exposes what critics describe as the hypocritical and self-serving nature of his politics.

Akhtar Mengal’s political career began in 1988 when he won his first election from PB-31 on a BNA ticket. He was re-elected in 1993 from PB-31 Khuzdar on a BNM-N ticket. His political peak came in 1997 when he became Chief Minister of Balochistan, serving from 22 February 1997 to 13 August 1998 while representing PB-31 Khuzdar.

He later served as a member of the National Assembly from 2018 to 2023. His father, Sardar Ataullah Mengal, also served as chief minister, highlighting the family’s long dominance in provincial politics.

In November 1998, Akhtar Mengal’s provincial government collapsed due to internal divisions and factionalism within the Balochistan National Party, not because of federal intervention. In 2006, he led a long march from Gwadar to Quetta under the banner of Lashkar-e-Balochistan, a proscribed organization. Reports have also linked his brother, Javed Mengal, to militant activities in the province.

Wadh, Khuzdar, and the Neglect of Basic Infrastructure

Despite this long history of power, basic conditions in Mengal’s ancestral region of Wadh in Khuzdar remain dire. The area still lacks a basic road. Residents carry patients on stretchers for miles to reach hospitals.

In Aranji, a locality of Wadh tehsil, there is no road at all. Women facing childbirth complications and seriously ill patients often lose their lives due to the absence of medical access. These realities raise a serious question about leadership that speaks loudly about rights while neglecting the most basic needs of its own people.

In the financial year 2023–24, the government allocated a total of PKR 16.59 billion for public development projects for 20 elected members of the Balochistan National Party. These funds were meant for education, health, clean drinking water, roads, electricity, and other essential services.

Yet, no clear or visible impact of these billions of rupees can be seen on the ground. Significant amounts were allocated to individual legislators, but ordinary citizens continue to wait for meaningful change.

Balochistan’s problems are real and complex. Terrorism has killed innocent civilians, poverty remains widespread, and trust in institutions is weak. But placing all responsibility on the military and the federal government ignores decades of shared accountability.

Provincial rulers, tribal elites, and political leaders who held power must also answer for their failures. Without honest accountability at all levels, speeches and allegations will continue, while the lives of ordinary people in Balochistan remain unchanged.

This analysis reflects the author’s assessment of political accountability in Balochistan.